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Abstract: The paper aims to evaluate the implications of the new residential 
pricing system in China by examining price and income elasticity of demand by 
different household types. We use pre-reform annual panel data for 29 provinces 
over a fourteen year period, from 1998 to 2011, applying feasible generalize least 
squares models. The price and income elasticities for household sector are -0.412, 
and 1.476 at nation level, -0.300 and 1.550 in urban areas and -0.522 and 1.093 
in rural areas respectively. With regional effects, the price and income elasticities 
are -0.146 and 1.286 for urban households in coastal provinces and -0.772 and 
1.259 for urban households in inland provinces respectively. The empirical results 
reveal that there is important heterogeneity in the responsiveness to electricity 
price changes according to household income level and location.  
 
The proposal for restructuring the electricity pricing system in the household 
sector had sparked hot debates in the Chinese society since October 2010. These 
debates mainly concerned two questions. First, was the effect of the proposed rise 
in retail electricity price different across residents? Second, was the proposed 
pricing system fair for households with different income levels? The government 
believed that the proposed rise in electricity prices was necessary, and the increase 
was reasonable. So it would not have a negative impact on residents’ daily life. In 
contrast, many residents argued the pricing scheme did not appropriately address 
income inequality across regions and households, and if carried out as planned it 
would increase the burden on some households. After receiving a wide range of 
opinions and suggestions, the proposal was modified and announced by the 
government as ‘Multistep Electricity Price’ in July 2012. This study attempts to 
evaluate the reform in the pricing system by providing robust empirical evidence 
by investigating the pre-reform price and income elasticity of household demand 
for electricity across regions and income levels in China.  
Existing literature on the issue is limited and primarily focuses on the 
impact of electricity demand on economic growth at aggregate country level. Such 
information is inappropriate for judging the effect of the current residential pricing 
on the demand for electricity in China. One reason is that aggregate estimates are 
not suitable to explain consumption of electricity of different groups of 
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households. From a social and economic perspective, electricity sector provides 
for the daily necessity of 1.3 billion people in China. Financial returns should not 
be the only consideration for electricity pricing, household’s ability to cope with 
the cost of living should also be considered. Even though the Chinese economic 
growth has been impressive in the past three decades, the inequality of income 
distribution has also widened significantly. A second reason challenging previous 
results is that comparing with developed countries, supply of electricity is less 
reliable in developing countries, including China. This is due mainly to the 
problem of supply shortages, grid performance, wiring deficiencies and other 
technical issues. Previous studies on the electricity pricing in China all assumed 
that supply of electricity was sufficient and reliable which is unrealistic, despite 
the improvements made in recent years. Hence there is a need to control for the 
supply reliability in the analysis. 
Given the debates in the society and lack of appropriate studies in the 
literature, this paper aims to investigate the price and income elasticity of 
household demand for electricity by multidimensional household average income 
levels in China. The paper assesses residents’ responsiveness to changes in 
electricity price and their income while controlling for several other factors 
affecting demand commonly used in the literature. These are the price of 
residential pipeline natural gas, weather, and electricity supply reliability. The 
main contribution of the paper is two-fold. First, we provide robust empirical 
evidence for China by employing good quality panel data for 29 provinces over a 
fourteen year period, from 1998 to 2011 and applying feasible generalized least 
squares estimator. Second, we explicitly incorporate the electricity supply 
reliability effect into the analysis.  
The results, on the whole, provide evidence of highly statistically significant 
residential electricity price elasticities of less than one and income elasticities of 
demand larger than one. The empirical results reveal that disposable income 
substantially impacts on demand, and there is important heterogeneity in the 
responsiveness to electricity price changes according to household income levels. 
Poorer households are more sensitive to changes in electricity prices than richer 
urban households. We, therefore, argue that the current electricity pricing system 
might have underestimated the impact of changes in electricity price on some 
households, especially in low-income inland provinces.  
Next, in the paper, the residential electricity market and its pricing system 
are discussed, followed by a review of the literature. We then discuss theoretical 
considerations, data and estimation methodology. Empirical results are reported, 
and policy implications of the findings are discussed followed by a conclusion.  
 
Residential electricity pricing system in China 
 
Evolution of residential electricity prices 
 
In the 1950s, each electricity supply company in China had its own right of 
independent pricing. There were many different electricity pricing forms. Even the 
National Planning Commission (NPC) was not able to discover and control the 
whole situation. Some regions allowed using grain in exchange for electricity. For 
example, per unit residential electricity usage was measured by 1 kilogram of 
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millet in Baotou region in 1950. In the following year, the usage of grain was 
replaced by currency, and it was approximately equated to 0.22 RMB (Renminbi) 
per unit (kilowatt hour, kWh)
1
.  
 
Table 1 
Province Official Residential Electricity Prices and Retail Residential Prices 
of Pipeline Natural Gas in 2011  
 
Province  REP GP Province  REP GP 
Anhui 0.558 2.114 Jiangxi  0.600 4.048 
Beijing 0.481 1.830 Jilin 0.520 2.054 
Chongqing 0.515 1.536 Liaoning 0.495 2.083 
Fujian 0.518 3.404 Ningxia 0.449 1.280 
Gansu 0.510 1.295 Qinghai 0.443 1.161 
Guangdong 0.610 3.698 Sanxi (陕西)  0.498 1.786 
Guangxi 0.526 4.503 Shandong 0.493 2.003 
Guizhou 0.451 3.304 Shanghai 0.615 2.232 
Hainan 0.598 2.321 Shanxi 0.462 1.446 
Hebei 0.495 2.161 Sichuan 0.520 1.516 
Heilongjiang 0.505 1.682 Tianjin 0.485 1.964 
Henan 0.503 1.696 Xinjiang 0.474 1.390 
Hubei 0.567 2.088 Yunman  0.421 4.563 
Hunan 0.581 2.304 Zhejiang 0.553 2.920 
Jiangsu  0.523 1.964 Average 0.516 2.288 
 
Notes: REP denotes residential electricity price taken from electricity supply 
enterprises at province level. RMB per unit (kWh). GP denotes the price of 
pipeline natural gas taken from the China Price Information network. RMB per 
cubic meter. 1 cubic meter of natural gas is approximately equivalent to 11 kWh.   
 
In 1960, the central government introduced a unified management principle 
for electricity prices and the state started regulating them. The NPC and the 
Ministry of Water Resources and Electric Power jointly issued the national 
electricity prices catalogue
2
. This is the first time that China had electricity prices 
catalogue
3
 for different regions. Electricity enterprises had to implement these 
retail prices to residents and to the industrial and commercial sectors. For instance, 
residential electricity price was approximately 0.29 RMB per unit in Guangxi 
province in 1960
4
 while it was 0.22 RMB per unit
5 
in Hubei province. The retail 
electricity prices were highly centralized and fairly stable in many areas until the 
1990s. Most of the prices were between 0.20 RMB to 0.30 RMB per unit.  
Residential electricity prices underwent numerous adjustments and increases 
from 1997 until 2005. Subsequently, the retail prices have not changed much. 
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Table 1 shows retail residential electricity price in 2011. The highest price is 0.615 
RMB per unit in Shanghai while the lowest is in Yunman, 0.421 RMB per unit. 
The average price in the country is 0.516 RMB per unit. Despite the massive 
investment in the electricity industry and the rapid increase of income, the level of 
the official residential electricity prices seems to have remained at a fairly low 
level. Considering pipeline natural gas as a substitute energy source, its prices at 
the provincial and national levels look higher than electricity prices, but 1.00 
RMB per cubic meter of natural gas is approximately equivalent to 0.091 RMB 
per kWh of electric power. Compared with other countries, the average residential 
electricity price in China also appears low, but as a proportion of income it is one 
of the highest (see Table 2).   
 
Table 2 
Comparison of International Average Residential Electricity Prices in 2011 
  
Country Price  
 
(cents per kWh) 
Income  
per capita 
(U.S dollar) 
Ratio  
of price and income  
(per 1000 kWh) 
China 8.3 5,417 1.534 
Germany 32.5 44,111 0.737 
France 17.7 44,007 0.402 
Italy 25.8 36,267 0.711 
Japan 17.6 45,870 0.383 
Poland 18.9 13,469 1.403 
Romania 13.9 8,875 1.566 
South Korea 8.9 22,424 0.397 
Turkey 15.7 10,363 1.515 
United Kingdom 18.4 38,811 0.474 
United State 11.9 48,387 0.245 
 
Source: Eurostat (2011). U.S. Energy Information Administration (2011). 
International Monetary Fund (2010-2011). The prices for Japan and South Korea 
are for 2008. 
 
Urban and rural residential electricity prices 
 
According to the pricing policy in China, there has been no distinction between 
urban and rural residential prices, but one price for all residents. In practice, 
however, the price for rural residents was much higher than for those urban 
residents in the 1990s. This was mainly due to arbitrary charges to rural residents. 
It was common that the average price charged to rural end-users was much higher 
than that to urban users. According to Dang (2000), the actual residential 
electricity price was 1.50 RMB per unit in most rural areas; in few places it was 
even 5.00 RMB per unit. The average residential price in urban areas was only 
approximately 0.40 RMB per unit in 1998.  
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In order to reduce the burden on farmers and rural end-users, the National 
Development and Planning Commission (NDPC) and the State Grid Corporation 
of China (SGCC) issued two urgent telegrams to electricity supply sector in 1998
6
. 
Since then, the arbitrary charges were gradually ameliorated. At the same time, 
arguably, the Asian financial crisis led to electricity surplus. This crisis opened up 
an opportunity to address the problems. In the same year, the State Council 
(document 134, 1998) formulated six large-scale infrastructure projects to expand 
domestic demand and stimulate economic growth. Rural electricity network 
development and improvement was one of these projects. The project aimed to 
reform management system and standardize management, to develop and improve 
rural distribution network and to facilitate power supply cost reduction and 
alleviate end-users’ burdens. The expected outcomes were ultimately to merge 
urban and rural distribution networks and to achieve uniform residential electricity 
price for all urban and rural areas. This project was popularly called “Two 
Changes and One Price”. According to the NDPC7, the majority of provinces had 
achieved one price for urban and rural areas by 2003.  
 
Residential electricity pricing system reform 
 
In recent decades, the electricity sector in China has been through several key 
stages of reforms aiming at the creation of competitive power markets. One 
critical step was the dismantlement of the State Power Corporation in 2002 into 
five state-owned power groups (the Big Five) and the State Grid Corporation as 
the central government aimed to end the monopoly in the power generation 
industry. These six organizations and numerous province branch companies 
together manage power supply market. The pricing is influenced by bargaining 
process between the industry oligarchs and the administrative control represented 
by the National Development and Planning Commission (NDPC).   
Along with the reform in 2002, the State Council also launched “Electricity 
Pricing System Reform Scheme” (document 62, 2003) in the following year, and 
the price reform was a key component of the power sector reform. The ultimate 
aim of the scheme was to allow end-users a free choice of electricity supplier and 
to enjoy an equilibrium price in the electricity market. 
Even though, the price reform was meant to be a core issue of the whole 
power sector reform, there were complications and difficulties. The scheme, in 
fact, had not been fully implemented. The residential electricity pricing system 
remained largely unchanged since then. However, fuel market prices increased 
rapidly since the early 2000s and power enterprises strongly criticized the 
inadequate residential pricing system. The reason for the criticism was that 
residential sector had been adopting a single electricity pricing policy. The single 
pricing policy means that a household is charged a single electricity price 
regardless of the total amount of electricity usage. In addition, the enterprises 
insisted on increasing residential electricity prices because they were much lower 
than the prices in the industrial sector and the average electricity price in the 
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country. Furthermore, residential electricity prices had been lagging behind coal 
and gas prices. It was, therefore, not possible for the electricity industry to cover 
its costs. Hence, electricity pricing reform for the residential sector had been on 
the top of the agenda since late 2000s.  
On the basis of domestic and international situation, the NDRC announced a 
draft proposal for implementing a new pricing system to replace the single price 
system for residential customers on 9
th
 October 2010. The draft proposal aimed at 
introducing an increasing block tariff. The proposed increasing block tariff 
envisaged that monthly electricity consumption to be divided into three categories 
and charges on electricity consumption to be progressively increasing based on 
the amount of electricity usage. The NDRC believed that the new tariff would 
improve the whole pricing system. It was also expected to address the problem of 
electricity shortage and high fuel prices. Furthermore, it was planned gradually to 
align the pre-reform (low) single residential electricity price to a rational and 
reasonable pricing system. The tariff was also expected to encourage reduction in 
electricity consumption and the associated pollution.  
However, the benefits of the new tariff had not been convincing for many 
households and had attracted widespread repercussion, criticism and fears 
amongst residential customers which are mainly subject to income disparity
8
. 
Despite the public disapproval according to the NDRC statistics from a total of 
21,794 comments 61% showed support while only 34.5% - opposition. It was also 
argued that the draft proposal did not envisage a significant increase in electricity 
price and for 70% to 80% of households’ electricity bill would remain unchanged. 
In July 2012, the NDRC has modified the draft by increasing the rate of 
unaffected consumers from the initial 70%-80% to 80%-90% across provinces 
and regions.  
 
Literature review 
 
In the consumer behavior theory, a measure of household’s demand sensitivity is 
its responsiveness to changes in prices, holding other factors constant. Households 
react to changes in the electricity price by adjusting their electricity demand. As 
price hikes, households reduce the quantity used while as price falls the household 
response is the opposite. This responsiveness of households to price changes is 
characterized by “price elasticity of demand” in the consumer behavior theory. In 
demand elasticity context, the theory not only suggests how sensitive demand for 
electricity is to changes in the price of electricity, but also to changes in the prices 
of related energy sources and to changes in income. A number of previous studies 
adopt this basic economic framework to conduct their analysis.   
 
The gap in the domestic literature 
 
Several early studies investigate the relationship between Chinese electricity 
consumption, prices and output within macroeconomic or regional frameworks. 
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Lin (2003) discusses the variation of electricity prices across the country and 
concludes that the available electricity prices are not adequate to examine the 
relationship between electricity consumption and economic output at national 
level. Therefore, the study adopts time series data from 1978 to 2001 for the price 
of coal as a proxy for the electricity prices. The estimated price elasticity is 
unusually low, only 0.016. A study by Lam (2004) concludes that the average 
electricity prices are below the average total costs and highly subsidized as the 
author investigates the determinants of the average electricity price for 26 
provinces with cross-section data for 1998. Xu and Chen (2006) point out that one 
of the most serious problems with electricity prices is that it does not reflect the 
true relationship between supply and demand. Similarly, Zhang and Heller (2007) 
describe that the electricity demand and supply relationship is based on planned 
allocation by the government, and conclude that tariffs have a little relation with 
the real cost of supplying power or demand. 
He et al. (2011) examine the demand price elasticity for several sectors: 
residential, agricultural, industrial, and commercial. The study adopts computable 
general equilibrium model with cross-section data for 2007. In terms of the 
residential sector, the study concludes that the price elasticity is only -0.3 which 
indicates that residents are not sensitive to change in electricity prices across the 
nation. However, one underlying assumption of He et al.’s (2011) study is that 
there are no constraints to the electricity power supply which is unlikely the case 
in China. Zhao et al. (2012) conduct an investigation on the impact of electricity 
policies on electricity generation efficiency with regional data and pooled 
regressions. The study considers average price effect measured as the ratio of 
revenue and quantity of electricity sold over the period 1993-2007. 
There are two concerns regarding previous studies. First, it may be true that 
the average electricity price is low given the massive and ongoing investment in 
the electricity industry. However, the existing studies are not adequate to reveal 
the effect of prices and the proposed alternative electricity pricing system on the 
demand for electricity in the household sector. The primary reason is that 
national-level information is not suitable for explaining consumption of electricity 
by different groups of households. Furthermore, from an econometric point of 
view shortcomings stem from problems with data used for analysis, the 
specifications selected for the estimating equations, or sometimes from the 
variables used. Apart from these aspects, previous studies also do not focus on the 
consequences of varying household income levels even though it is generally 
accepted that there are large income disparities between regions and rural and 
urban areas. Therefore, the existing econometric estimates do not provide 
sufficient information about the pricing reform effects on households. Besides, 
although the generation and supply of electricity in China has significantly 
improved, the reliability of supply is still in doubt. According to the Electricity 
Power Reliability Management Center, the average of interruption hours per 
customer (AIHC-1) is 7.01 hours per household across the nation in 2011. The 
rural supply system performance is much poorer than the urban one; the AIHC-1 
 8 
 
is 18.43 hours per rural household in 2011. With this in mind, there is thus a need 
to control for the reliability factor when examining price elasticity of electricity 
demand.  
 
The international literature 
 
Many theoretical and empirical studies on the price and income elasticity of 
residential electricity demand have been carried out in an international context. 
Early studies are conducted by Houthakker (1951) and Fisher and Kaysen (1962)
9
. 
These studies obtain varying results depending on the variables used. Houthakker 
(1951) carries out a pioneering cross-sectoral study of electricity demand in the 
UK. He assumes the presence of stable demand function and shows the demand 
for electricity is quite sensitive to both changes in prices and income. Fisher and 
Kaysen (1962) use time series data from 1946 to 1957 for 47 states in the United 
States. They add extra non-economic variables such as utilization rates of 
appliance stocks. In the short run, the findings of Fisher and Kaysen (1962) agree 
with Houthakker’s (1951) study – the demand of residential electricity mainly 
depends on price and income. In the long run, Fisher and Kaysen conclude that 
non-economic variables are the primary determinants of residential electricity 
demand while electricity price has a lesser impact on demand.  
However, the measurement of appliance stocks is difficult; Fisher and 
Kaysen (1962) point out that the quality of their data ranged “…from somewhat 
below the sublime to a bit above the ridiculous…” and that “…no results can be 
better than the data on which they are based (p.27)”. Wills (1977) states that lack 
of adequate data for these stocks have usually precluded their use in empirical 
work while he examines a cross-section data of 77 cities in the USA. 
Subsequently, Wills (1977) reveals that a high quality of measurement on the 
stocks is necessary otherwise the long run analysis is hampered. Although the 
appliance stock is a determinant of the demand for electricity, to obtain a high 
quality data is still problematic until now. Therefore, recent studies exclude 
appliance stock from analysis
10
. Given data limitation, some studies use income as 
a proxy for appliance stock.  
Recently, the interest in empirical studies of residential electricity demand 
has increased. It is mainly due to the tendency of global electricity sectors 
becoming more competitive and deregulated. Furthermore, knowledge of the 
determinants of residential electricity demand and its accurate forecasting are 
relevant for assessing proposals to revise electricity rates and for predicting the 
residential electricity demand. Larsen and Nesbakken (2004) and Narayan and 
Smyth (2005) investigate the determinants of the demand for residential electricity. 
Their economic model states that residential electricity demand is a function of its 
own price, the price of substitute sources of energy, real income, prices of 
household appliances as well as other variables, which might influence household 
preferences.  
Table 3 illustrates the most recent studies that have estimated the income 
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and price effects on residential electricity demand with various econometric 
techniques in different countries. On the whole, the results for income and price 
elasticity are consistent with the theory. Income elasticities are positive, and 
own-price elasticities are negative. In terms of variables used, all studies use 
residential electricity consumption as an indicator for electricity demand. The 
most popular independent variables are mainly economic factors such as 
electricity price, substitute energy price(s) and household income. Features of 
dwellings appear in several studies such as the size of dwelling, stock of 
appliances and the outdoor temperature, among them, the outdoor temperature is 
the most frequently used in recent studies.   
A study by Nakajima (2010) for Japan shows that own price elasticity is 
greater than 1 – demand in Japan is price elastic. Similarly, Narayan et al. (2007) 
provide panel data results for G7 developed economies that indicate in the 
long-run residential demand for electricity is price elastic, 1.45; and income 
inelastic, 0.31. Overall, existing studies demonstrate that in developed economies, 
electricity demand is generally price elastic in the long run as the estimates are 
above 1. In contrast, in developing countries such as India, Turkey, Sri Lanka, 
Taiwan and South Korea demand is own-price inelastic in the long run. These 
price elasticities of demand are from 0.15 to 0.39. In terms of income elasticity, 
only Taiwan and South Korea show elasticities greater than 1.  
Three issues arise in the literature based on the findings of the international 
empirical studies. First, the conventional wisdom is that those households with 
higher income are less sensitive to energy prices than households with medium to 
low incomes. Accordingly, household in developed economies should react less to 
the changes of electricity prices than households in developing countries. 
However, there is opposite evidence in the literature for the long run. The reason 
is likely that developing countries tightly regulate their markets leading to 
artificially low price electricity in residential sectors.  
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Table 3 
International Studies of Residential Electricity Demand 
 
Country  Data period  Variables  Income elasticity  Own  price 
elasticity  
Estimation  
technique or framework 
Author   
Indian  Survey data: 
1993-1994 
Monthly 
3000 
households  
REC; Electricity price; 
Kerosene price; LPG price; 
Personal income; Covered 
area of the welling square 
feet. 
0.60-0.64 across 
all three seasons 
-0.42 winter  
-0.29 summer  
Cross-section data techniques Filippini 
and 
Pachauri 
2004 
Turkey  Time-series:  
 
1968-2000 
Per capita REC; The real 
income; The real residential 
electricity price; The 
urbanization rate. 
Long-run: 
0.70  
Long-run: 
-0.52 
The bounds testing procedure 
to cointegration (Pesaran et 
al., 2001) 
Halicioglu 
2007 
South 
Korean 
Time-series: 
 
1973-2007 
Household disposable 
income; The real electricity 
prices; Structural factors. 
Long-run: 
1.33 
Long-run: 
-0.23 
Structural time series model 
(Harvey, 1989)  
Sa’ad, 2009 
The 
United 
States 
Panel data: 
48 states 
1993 -2008 
REC; The real person 
income; The real price of 
electricity; HDD and CDD. 
48 states:  
0.38 (1993-2000) 
0.85 (2001-2008) 
Long-run: 
-0.33 (93-2000) 
-0.14 (2001-2008) 
Panel cointegration test 
(Pedroni, 1999) 
Nakajima 
and Hamori 
2010 
Australia Time-series:  
 
1969-2000 
Per capita REC; The real 
income; HDD+CDD; The 
real price of gas; The real 
electricity price. 
Long-run: 
0.323-0.408 
Short-run: 
0.0121-0.0415 
Long-run: 
-0.541 
Short-run: 
-0.263 
The bounds testing procedure 
to cointegration (Pesaran et 
al., 2001) 
Narayan 
and Smyth 
2005 
The 
United 
States 
Time-series: 
 
1965-2006 
Per capita REC; The real 
capita income; The real 
average residential price of 
electricity; HDD+CDD; The 
Long-run: 
0.273 
Short-run: 
0.101 
Long-run: 
-1.0652 
Short-run: 
-0.386 
The ARDL bounds testing 
procedure to cointegration 
(Pesaran and Pesaran, 1997) 
Dergiades 
and 
Tsoulfidis 
2008 
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average price of oil; The 
stock of housing. 
Sri 
Lanka 
Time-series: 
 
1960-2007 
Per capita REC; The real 
per capita GDP; The 
average real price of 
electricity; The average real 
prices of kerosene oil; The 
average real prices of LP 
gas. 
Long-run: 
0.78 
 
Short-run: 
0.32 
Long-run: 
-0.62 
 
Short-run: 
-0.16 
Cointegration and 
error-models developed by 
Engle-Granger (1987) 
Athukorala 
and Wilson 
2009 
Japan  Panel data: 
46 
prefectures 
1975-2000 
The per household REC; 
The real disposable income 
per household; The real unit 
price of the residential 
electricity. 
Long-run: 
0.602 
Long-run: 
-1.127 
Panel unit root tests (Levin et 
al., 2002); Panel cointegration 
tests (Pedroni, 1999); 
Johansen-Fisher-type 
cointegration test (Maddala 
and Wu, 1999) 
Nakajima 
2010 
Taiwan Time-series: 
 
1955-1995 
Per capita REC; The real 
electricity price; The 
percentage of the population 
living in cities; The real 
disposable per capita 
income; The real world oil 
price; HDD and CDD. 
Long-run: 
1.04 
 
Short-run:  
0.23 
Long-run: 
-0.16 
 
Short-run: 
-0.15 
The general-to-specific 
modelling approach (Hendry, 
1986 and Hendry and 
Juseliue, 2000, 2001) 
Engle and Granger method 
(1987) 
Holtedahl 
and Joutz 
2004 
G7: Panel data: 
 
1978 -2003 
Per capita REC; The real 
income per capita; The real 
price of natural gas; The 
real residential electricity 
Long-run: 
0.3119 
Short-run: 
Insignificant  
Long-run: 
-1.4502 
Short-run: 
Insignificant   
Panel OLS; Panel DOLS 
Panel unit root test (Breitung, 
2000); Panel cointegration 
(Pedroni,2004) 
Narayan, 
Smyth and 
Prasad 
2007 
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price. 
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Second, regarding the stock of appliances, demand for electricity is derived 
from the flow of services provided by the household’s durable energy-using 
appliances. The use of these household appliances is related to construction 
features of dwellings, for example, space heating and cooling, lighting, the 
number of people in the household as well as the outdoor temperature. However, 
it is likely that there is a high correlation between stock of appliances and income 
in developing countries since households will purchase more appliances when 
they have higher income in order to improve the quality of living. The high 
correlation makes difficult to estimate accurately the effect of each variable on the 
demand for residential electricity. Therefore, there is an argument that the stock of 
appliances should be omitted from specifications in developing countries or 
instrumented with appliance prices.  
Third, there has not been much work done on the effect of electricity supply 
reliability in developing countries where intermittent interruptions to supply are 
common place. It is thus indispensable to capture the effect in examining 
electricity pricing. One of the contributions of this study is to extend the existing 
literature on the Chinese residential electricity issues by introducing a technical 
index of electricity supply reliability as a controlling factor. 
 
Theoretical considerations, data and estimation methodology 
 
The demand model 
 
As discussed in the literature review, the majority of previous empirical studies 
relies on the consumer behavior theory and develops empirical demand models 
for analyzing the residential electricity consumption. A standard model represents 
residential electricity demand as a function of own price, the prices of substitute 
sources of energy, income, prices of household appliances, stock of housing and 
temperature.
11
 In setting up our model, we point to the fact that electricity utilities 
are typically natural monopolies in all different contexts so that the standard 
residential electricity demand model developed for Western economies is largely 
applicable to developing countries as well (see also Table 3). Even if, we accepted 
that the market structure differs in terms of the degrees of competition between 
developed and developing countries, the relatively higher degree of competition in 
the West would permit end-customers to have more choices for their electric 
power suppliers. This, in turn, means lower prices and better services from 
suppliers. Yet, the majority of end-customers have less/or no choices in 
developing countries, but they often benefit from monopoly or oligopoly in these 
countries due to the strict regulation and control of utilities by governments. That 
is the reason why electricity retail prices are often artificially low despite high 
generation and distribution costs in developing countries. In this respect, the role 
of market players may not be particularly significant, but rather common factors 
in the standard model. For example, Kirschen (2003) points out that the 
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introduction of competition in the electricity retail market has not been very 
successful even in California. 
Many studies fall well short of the ideal empirical specification because of 
data constraints. Therefore, Narayan and Smyth (2005) suggest a parsimonious 
demand model including own price, prices of substitute energy, income, and 
temperature. This suggestion implicitly assumes non-binding supply of electricity 
which is appropriate in developed economies. However, sufficient and consistent 
supply of electricity is not the case in developing countries like China. Therefore, 
we extend the general model in the panel setting as follows.  
 
𝐷𝑖𝑡 = 𝑓(𝐸𝑃𝑖𝑡, 𝐺𝑃𝑖𝑡, 𝑌𝑖𝑡, 𝑅𝑖𝑡,𝑊𝑖𝑡, 𝐴𝑖𝑡), 𝑖 = 1…𝑁, 𝑡 = 1… 𝑇,            (1) 
 
where D denotes the residential electricity consumption per capita (kWh), i 
denotes cross-sectional unit and t stands for time period. EP represents the real 
retail residential electricity price (RMB per kWh). GP denotes the real price of 
natural gas (RMB per cubic meter). Y is the real annual household disposable 
income per capita (RMB) that is also used as a proxy for the household electric 
appliances and household characteristics. Income is calculated for three groups of 
households: average national income (YA), urban household income (YU) and 
rural household income (YR). R denotes electricity supply reliability and its 
corresponding indicator is the average interruption hours per customer (AIHC-1). 
W captures weather conditions and is calculated as a sum of the total number of 
heating degree days and cooling degree days. A depicts a set of unobservable 
factors in a panel data setting.  
Equation (1) can be further modified following Beenstock et al. (1999) by 
expressing it in a relative price form. This is the most common specification in the 
literature (Narayan and Smyth, 2005): 
 
𝐷𝑖𝑡 = 𝑓(𝐸𝑃𝑖𝑡/𝐺𝑃𝑖𝑡, 𝑌𝑖𝑡, 𝑅𝑖𝑡,𝑊𝑖𝑡, 𝐴𝑖𝑡),  𝑖 = 1…𝑁, 𝑡 = 1…𝑇.            (2) 
 
Data and variables 
 
Residential electricity demand 
  
Residential electricity consumption (REC) has been sharply increasing in the past 
three decades in China. For instance, REC was 480.8 billion kWh in 1990 while 
total REC increased to 4,396.1 billion kWh in 2008 (China Statistical Yearbook, 
2010), which is a nine times increase. The REC share of total electricity 
consumption was approximately 12% which is much lower than industrial 
electricity consumption (80%) in 2008. Nevertheless, REC represents the second 
largest share of total electricity consumption and it directly affects more than a 
billion people living standards in China. We use annual REC per capita as demand 
indicator. Data are mainly from the China Energy Statistical Yearbook from 1999 
to 2012. Figure 1 shows that the residential electricity consumption per capita 
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increases over the period and that the spread of electricity consumption varies 
substantially across coastal and inland provinces. Richer provinces consistently 
consume more electric power than poorer provinces.  
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Table 4 
Summary of Variables  
 
Variable Description Unit Min. 
1
st
 
Qu. 
Median  Mean   3
rd
 Qu. Max. 
EC Residential electricity consumption kWh per capita 46 124 201 238.3 312.5 797 
EP The real residential electricity prices RMB per k kWh 280.1 439.5 488.6 499.6 552.4 929.6 
GP The real price of the pipeline natural gas RMB per cubic meter 871 1,683 2,167 2,433 2,955 7,310 
R The electricity supply reliability Minute per household 49.8 355.7 581.9 788.4 946.3 6,492 
W The sum of heating degree day and 
cooling degree day 
Degree 2,512 4,667 5,543 5,910 6,844 11,487 
YA The real average household disposable 
income 
Thousand RMB per capita 2,815 4,671 6,304 7,112 8,582 22,491 
YU The real average urban household 
disposable income 
Thousand RMB per capita 4,196 7,039 9,505 10,468 12,645 31,170 
YR The real average rural household 
disposable income 
Thousand RMB per capita 1,399 2,290 3,141 3,756 4,493 13,811 
Coastal  Coastal provinces  Thousand RMB per capita 3,868 6,675 9,116 9,882 12,439 22,491 
Inland  Inland provinces  Thousand RMB per capita 2,815 4,342 5,685 6,078 7,698 11,889 
Inland-low The bottom five of low income inland 
provinces 
Thousand RMB per capita 2,826 3,982 5,010 5,228 6,353 8,837 
 
Notes: Coastal provinces (9): Beijing, Shanghai, Zhejiang, Guangdong, Jiangsu, Tianjin, Shandong, Fujian and Hebei. The bottom five 
Inland-low provinces (5): Xinjiang, Guizhou, Gansu, Ningxia, and Qinghai. Inland provinces (15): the rest. 1
st
 Qu and 3
rd
 Qu stand for the first 
 18 
 
and the third quantile respectively. 
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Household income  
 
Increase in income and its impact on living standards is an important driving force 
of electricity consumption in China. As household income increases, residents 
tend to buy a bigger size of dwelling and use more electric appliances resulting in 
higher consumption of electricity for cooking, heating, lighting and entertaining. 
Figure 1 and Figure 2 show that the trends of electricity consumption and income 
closely increase. The majority of previous studies show that income is a 
significant determinant of demand for electricity. We employ the real household 
disposable income per capita as an indicator for household income. It is taken 
from the Chinese Statistic Yearbook from 1999 to 2012. 
Figure 2 displays the income differences across all 29 provinces, classified 
into coastal, inland and the bottom five (low-income) inland provinces. In 2011, 
the coastal province with the highest average income (22,491 RMB per capita) 
was Shanghai, in the east of China. In contrast, the lowest average income (7,396 
RMB per capita) inland province was Gansu, in the northwest of China. The 
household incomes in both provinces have doubled over the fourteen year period. 
Nevertheless, the growth in incomes has also led to the widening of income 
disparities. The coastal provinces (Shanghai, Beijing, Zhejiang, Guangdong, 
Jiangsu, Tianjin, Shandong, Fujian and Hebei) grew the most and were far ahead 
of others. The bottom five inland provinces are Gansu, Shanxi, Guizhou, Xinjiang 
and Qinghai.  
Table 4 provides information about the disparity in incomes between urban 
and rural households. It is clear that urban household income is much higher than 
the rural one. On average, urban household income is approximately 10,468 RMB 
per capita while rural household income is around 3,756 RMB per capita. This 
level of the rural household income is similar to the income of households living 
in urban areas with minimum income of 2,815 RMB per capita. It is likely that 
these households will be more sensitive to changes in electricity price than rich 
urban households given the single pricing policy for residential electricity. 
 
Own-price effects 
 
As with the household income, real electricity price is another decisive factor 
affecting household demand. Generally, most residential electricity prices at 
province level have three classes according to capacity of power cables: less than 
1 kW; between 1 kW and 10 kW and great than 10 kW. The residential electricity 
price series represent in general average prices based on the first two classes, 
which are more common than the third class. The source of official retail price 
information is taken from each electricity supply enterprise at province level. 
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Expected reaction of households to high electricity prices is to reduce electricity 
demand. Households use more electricity with low electricity price than with high 
price. Accordingly, it is expected that there is a negative relationship between 
electricity price and households’ electricity consumption. Urban residents and 
high-income households, in general, may be less price-sensitive because the nominal 
electricity price has not changed very much over the period of analysis and the real 
electricity price has even decreased. In other words, urban and high-income 
households may be less responsive to own-price change. Meanwhile, residents in rural 
areas and low-income households are likely to be more sensitive to changes in the 
electricity prices 
Figure 3 shows the differences of residential electricity prices across coastal, 
inland and low-income inland provinces. Straight lines indicate that the average 
residential electricity price correspond to the order of regional income level. The price 
distribution exhibits weak association with levels of income. Two high-income 
provinces have fairly low electricity prices (Beijing and Fujian). In contrast, some 
low-middle income provinces have relatively high electricity prices. Nevertheless, 
according to the amount of electricity consumed, the price distribution seems to be 
fairly reasonable across the three levels of provinces. Figure 4 indicates that coastal 
provinces use the most electric power, and charged with higher prices, while the 
opposite is for the low-income inland provinces.  
 
Cross-price effects 
 
Generally, in the short run, increase in the price of electricity will increase the demand 
for substitute forms of energy such as natural gas, providing that appropriate 
appliances are already available. In the long run, an increase in the price of electricity 
will tend to increase stock of appliances that use other fuels. This will cause an 
outward shift in the demand curve for alternative fuels, with corresponding increases 
in the quantity consumed. However, traditionally the shift can be limited (Jan et al., 
1976). The reason is that households do not have the stock of appliances that permits 
them to switch between types of energy, in particular, in the short run. As a result, the 
shift is limited to the income effect until an adjustment in appliance stocks can occur.  
In the case of China, although the substitute energy equivalent price is lower 
than electricity price (see Table 4), the shift from electricity to the pipeline natural gas 
is restricted. Particularly, the infrastructure for the pipeline natural gas is limited in 
some urban areas and most rural areas in China. Consequently, the effect of the 
substitute energy will have little or no impact on these households responsiveness to 
changes in electricity own-price
12
. However, this shift may be more pronounced for 
some urban households, especially the Chinese government has increased efforts to 
boost urban infrastructure development. Therefore, cross-price effect might be 
significant for the demand of electricity in some urban areas.  
We use pipeline natural gas as a substitute fuel for electricity, because it has 
been a commonly used substitute fuel for electricity in urban areas in recent years. 
The natural gas price is taken from the China Price Information Network
13
 for the 
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period 1999 – 2012. The price is mainly based on information for urban residents in 
every province. Price of natural gas for rural residents is not available. As a result, the 
estimations for the cross-price effect for rural household are likely to be much lower 
(and less reliable) than for urban residents. In general, the cross-price effect should be 
positive.  
 
Electricity supply reliability and weather  
 
To measure electricity supply reliability we employ total annually average 
interruption hours per customer (AIHC-1) as an indicator controlling for the effect of 
electricity supply. The source of this variable is the Electricity Power Reliability 
Management Center which annually publishes a technical index based (only) on 10 
kW urban power supply system; other supply systems are not covered. Due to data 
availability we only can use the AIHC-1 as a proxy for all households. The expected 
effect of the interruption in supply is negative.  
The information on weather conditions is obtained from the Weather 
Underground
13
. We use for every provincial capital city the sum of heating degree 
days (HDD) and cooling degree days (CDD) as a proxy for the weather conditions at 
province level because information is not available for every city and county within a 
province. Both HDD and CDD are indexes with reference to temperature of 650F. 
The higher the HDD and CDD the more electricity households consume. Thus, the 
expected effect of temperature on demand is positive.  
 
Estimation methodology 
 
In the discussion on the main factors affecting electricity demand, we noted that there 
are differences across provinces and time. The estimation strategy contains two 
processes. First, we identify an appropriate estimator(s) for the models which include 
pooled ordinary least squares (POLS), robust methods, and feasible generalised least 
squares (FGLS) estimators with fixed effects panels. Second, based on the verified 
estimator(s), we examine the differences of the price and income elasticity of demand 
given the regional income effects and the price of substitute energy. The general fixed 
effects specifications are
14
:  
 
𝑙𝑛𝐷𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽1 + 𝛿𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑙𝑛𝐸𝑃𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑙𝑛𝐺𝑃𝑖𝑡+𝛽4𝑙𝑛𝑌𝑖𝑡 ++𝛽5𝑙𝑛𝑅𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽6𝑙𝑛𝑊𝑖𝑡 + 𝑒𝑖𝑡      (3) 
 
𝑙𝑛𝐷𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽1 + 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽2𝑙𝑛𝐸𝑃𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑙𝑛𝐺𝑃𝑖𝑡+𝛽4𝑙𝑛𝑌𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5𝑙𝑛𝑅𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽6𝑙𝑛𝑊𝑖𝑡 + 𝑒𝑖𝑡          (4) 
 
where 𝛼𝑖 and 𝛿𝑡 are the unobserved “individual” and time effects which represent 
the joint impact of the latent variables on the dependent variable 𝐷𝑖𝑡. Since energy 
consumption and the regressors are in logarithms, the coefficients are directly 
interpreted as demand elasticities. 
In the literature, previous studies correct for a bias associated with the 
endogeneity of electricity price in Equation (3) and Equation (4) (Blazquez et al., 
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2012, Alberini and Filippini, 2011, and Matsukawa, 2004). The reason is that many 
countries have been adopting increasing block pricing systems which are nonlinear in 
terms of price and quantity. As we discussed, the pre-reform pricing system was a 
single fixed price for each province in China; hence we treat electricity price as 
exogenous in our estimation.  
However, the dependent variable and the random error are suspected of 
heteroskedasticity since the variances for all observations are clearly not the same. If 
this is the case, this problem could be overcome by first using robust estimators and 
further applying FGLS estimator if necessary. The tests for the estimations include 
poolability by a standard F-test, the comparison of fixed and random effects models 
by Hausman (1978) test, serial correlation test by Wooldridge (2002) and 
cross-sectional dependence by Pesaran (2004).  
The next step is to test the null hypothesis if the electricity consumption 
behavior is the same across regions. To achieve this objective, we apply both intercept 
dummy and slope dummy variables for each additional explanatory variable in the 
verified equation, and then jointly test the significance of the dummy variable 
coefficients using the Chow test (Hill et al., 2008). Furthermore, we assume that 
regional income affects the parameters of prices and income. Supposing that time 
effect is detected in the first step then the specified model for each region is as in 
Equation (5):  
 
𝑙𝑛𝐷𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽1 + 𝛿𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑙𝑛𝐸𝑃𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑙𝑛𝐺𝑃𝑖𝑡+𝛽4𝑙𝑛𝑌𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5𝑙𝑛𝑅𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽6𝑙𝑛𝑊𝑖𝑡 + 𝜑𝑅𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑜𝑛
+ 𝜃1(𝑙𝑛𝑌𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝑅𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑜𝑛) + 𝜃2(𝑙𝑛𝐸𝑃𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝑅𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑜𝑛) + 𝜃3(𝑙𝑛𝐺𝑃𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝑅𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑜𝑛)
+ 𝜃4(𝑙𝑛𝑅𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝑅𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑜𝑛) + 𝜃5(𝑙𝑛𝑊𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝑅𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑜𝑛) + 𝑒𝑖𝑡                      (5) 
 
where Region includes three levels: coastal, inland and the bottom five (low income) 
provinces, as “the bottom five” is the reference group. If the F-statistics for testing the 
joint null hypothesis of equal parameters is less than a critical value, we will reject the 
null in favor of the alternative that at least one 𝜃𝑖 ≠ 0.  
The final step of our estimation strategy is to model the relative price based on 
the price of electricity substitute as in Equation (2). Presuming a verified fixed time 
effects model with an appropriate estimator, the estimating equation is defined as 
follows: 
 
𝑙𝑛𝐷𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽1 + 𝛿𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑙𝑛𝑅𝑃𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑙𝑛𝑌𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑙𝑛𝑊𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5𝑙𝑛𝑅𝑖𝑡 + 𝜑𝑅𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑜𝑛
+ 𝜃1(𝑙𝑛𝑅𝑃𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝑅𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑜𝑛) + 𝜃2(𝑙𝑛𝑌𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝑅𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑜𝑛) + 𝜃4(𝑙𝑛𝑊𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝑅𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑜𝑛)
+ 𝜃5(𝑙𝑛𝑅𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝑅𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑜𝑛) + 𝑒𝑖𝑡                                                                  (6) 
 
where lnRP is the log of the ratio of the real price of electricity to the real price of 
natural gas. The relative price variable is expected to be negatively related to 
electricity consumption and urban areas should have a higher parameter than the one 
at national level.  
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Results 
 
Model selection  
 
The coefficients estimated with fixed effect models are reported in Table 5 and Table 
6 which summarize estimation results for three groups of households – national, urban 
and rural. The estimators include pooled OLS, fixed time effects with robust standard 
errors, fixed individual effects with robust standard errors, and FGLS with time and 
individual effects.  
With regard to the national level and the urban sample (Table 5), poolability by 
F-statistics indicates that all time fixed effects models are significant at 10% and often 
at 1% level or better which implies that the electricity consumption functions shift 
over time. The time effect may be due to factors such as the rapid acceleration of 
Chinese economic growth that results in fast household income increasing from one 
year to the next. Similarly, the individual fixed effects are highly significant which 
reflects the substantial differences among provinces in terms of residential electricity 
consumption. Therefore, the POLS models are rejected. Second, the significant 
Hausman tests suggesting that fixed time effects are more favorable than random 
effects, which is consistent with our expectation. Third, Wooldridge's tests for serial 
correlation in fixed effects panels are only in favor of FGLS estimator with time 
effects at national level and urban areas. Furthermore, Pesaran tests for cross sectional 
dependence of the FGLS estimator with time effects are insignificant at 5% level. 
Hence, the evidence suggests that the FGLS with time fixed effects is valid models to 
assess residential electricity consumption for the national level and the urban samples.  
In terms of rural areas (Table 6), poolability tests suggest the need to control for 
either time or individual effects so that POLS is not appropriate. However, the rest of 
the models have the problem of serial correlation since the Wooldridge’s tests are 
insignificant. Such issue may be caused by omitted variables of other energy prices 
capturing effects of other conventional energy sources in rural area such as coal and 
wood
15
. Yet, the insignificant Pesaran test shows that there is not cross sectional 
dependence in fixed time effects regressions with robust standard errors, which may 
suggest that the estimates remain unbiased but inconsistent (Sarafidis and Wansbeek, 
2012; Pesaran, 2004; Cerrato and Srantis, 2002).  
 
Price and income elasticities without regional effects 
 
The coefficients of main interests of income, own-price and cross-price effects are 
statistically significant and are in line with the expectations of the consumer behavior 
theory (See Table 5 and Table 6).  
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Table 5 
National and Urban Income Models 
 
Income level National income Urban income 
Model Pooled FE t FE i FGLS t FGLS i Pooled FE t FE i FGLS t FGLS i 
Variable  Coef.(S.E) Coef.(S.E) Coef.(S.E) Coef.(S.E) Coef.(S.E) Coef.(S.E) Coef.(S.E) Coef.(S.E) Coef.(S.E) Coef.(S.E) 
Intercept  -8.034*** 
0.672 
    -10.288*** 
0.769 
    
EP -0.231** 
0.071 
-0.413*** 
0.094 
-0.077 
0.101 
-0.412*** 
0.004 
-0.079 
0.047 
-0.111 
0.078 
-0.306** 
0.101 
-0.135 
0.106 
-0.300*** 
0.010 
-0.127** 
0.047 
GP 0.118*** 
0.033 
0.107** 
0.034 
0.092* 
0.046 
0.107*** 
0.002 
0.022 
0.031 
0.165*** 
0.036 
0.148*** 
0.036 
0.115* 
0.048 
0.142*** 
0.008 
0.033 
0.031 
YA 1.318*** 
0.028 
1.474*** 
0.048 
1.303*** 
0.042 
1.476*** 
0.006 
1.097 
0.052 
     
YU       1.319*** 
0.031 
1.548*** 
0.057 
1.229*** 
0.043 
1.550*** 
0.010 
1.039*** 
0.049 
W  0.286*** 
0.038 
0.299*** 
0.039 
-0.0334 
0.096 
0.296*** 
0.002 
0.008 
0.027 
0.378*** 
0.042 
0.410*** 
0.042 
-0.005 
0.099 
0.401*** 
0.006 
0.020 
0.026 
R  -0.030* 
0.014 
-0.022 
0.016 
0.010 
0.011 
-0.022*** 
0.0002 
0.001 
0.005 
-0.057*** 
0.015 
-0.048** 
0.017 
0.004 
0.012 
-0.047*** 
0.001 
-0.001 
0.005 
SSE 18.645 17.745 8.811 17.745 10.171 22.083 20.425 9.363 20.429 10.625 
Adj.R^2 0.866 0.741 0.818 0.885 0.934 0.844 0.709 0.812 0.868 0.931 
Pooltest   F=1.521 
P=0.109 
F=14.829 
P<-2.2e-16 
   F=2.416 
P=0.004 
F=18.050 
P<-2.2e-16 
  
Hausman Test Chisq = 
48.30 
P = 
3.08e-09 
Chisq = 
11.68 
P=0.039 
   Chisq = 
50.10 
P = 1.3e-09 
Chisq= 
66.00  
P = 6.9e-13 
  
Wooldridge's test Chisq = 
1650.3 
P < 2.2e-16 
Chisq = 
520.45 
P < 2.2e-16 
Chisq= 
0.056 
P=0.814 
Chisq= 
801.4 
P<2.2e-16 
 Chisq = 
1690  
P < 2.2e-16 
Chisq =  
655 
P < 2.2e-16 
Chisq= 
0.269 
P=0.604 
Chisq= 
812.9 
P<2.2e-16 
Pesaran CD test Z=-1.389 
P=0.165  
Z=1.220 
P=0.222 
Z=-1.930 
P=0.054 
Z=9.066 
P<2.2e-16 
 Z=-1.522 
P=0.128 
Z=4.205 
P=2.6e-05 
Z=-1.418 
P=0.156 
Z=10.351 
P<2.2e-16 
Notes: ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at 1% level, 5% level and 10% level, respectively. 
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Table 6 
Rural Income Models 
 
Model Pooled FE t FE i FGLS t FGLS i 
Variable  Coef.(S.E) Coef.(S.E) Coef.(S.E) Coef.(S.E) Coef.(S.E) 
Intercept  -0.532 
0.621 
    
EP -0.623*** 
0.073 
-0.522*** 
0.098 
-0.024 
0.108 
-0.517*** 
0.005 
-0.033 
0.050 
GP -0.005 
0.035 
0.027 
0.035 
-0.047 
0.049 
0.024*** 
0.005 
-0.068** 
0.031 
YR  1.174*** 
0.026 
1.093*** 
0.037 
1.404*** 
0.049 
1.097*** 
0.007 
1.212*** 
0.048 
W  0.016 
0.040 
0.031 
0.041 
-0.071 
0.103 
0.034*** 
0.007 
-0.004 
0.030 
R  0.010 
0.015 
-0.006 
0.017 
0.024* 
0.012 
-0.006*** 
0.001 
0.007 
0.005 
SSE  20.57 19.106 10.09 19.108 11.14 
Adj.R^2 0.854 0.725 0.804 0.876 0.928 
Pool test   F= 2.280 
P=0.007 
F= 13.80 
P<2.2e-16 
  
Hausman test  Chisq=42.86 
P =3.9e-08 
Chisq=21.66 
P=6e-04 
  
Wooldridge test  Chisq= 1966 
P<2.2e-16 
Chisq= 328 
P<2.2e-16 
Chisq=15.624 
P=7.7e-05 
Chisq=736.6 
P<2.2e-16 
Pesaran CD test  Z=-1.327 
P=0.185  
Z=6.924 
P=4.4e-12 
Z=-2.357 
P=0.018 
Z=14.518 
P<2.2e-16 
Notes: ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at 1% level, 5% level and 10% level, respectively. 
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The electricity price shows a consistently negative effect on the quantity of 
electricity demanded when holding other factors constant. The elasticity is less than 1 
suggesting that the electricity demand is price inelastic. National, urban and rural 
samples show different estimates for the response of households to changes in 
residential electricity prices, -0.412, -0.300 and -0.522 respectively. The results reveal 
that (poorer) rural income households are more sensitive to changes in electricity 
prices than (richer) urban households.  
The household income variable is also consistently, significantly and positively 
related to electricity consumption for each income group, with elasticity above 1 when 
holding other factors fixed. Income elasticities suggest that the higher the household 
income the higher is the electricity demand in China. In other words, urban 
households demand more electricity than average income and rural households in 
China as the income elasticity is 1.550 greater than 1.480 at national level and 1.093 
in rural areas. The results are consistent with the expectations of the consumer 
behavior theory. 
The cross-price elasticities also are as expected, all positive and significant at 
the national level and for the urban households. Generally, the cross-price elasticity of 
urban households is higher than at national level. However, both elasticities are small, 
which suggests that there may not be a strong substitution relationship between the 
residential electricity and the alternative - residential natural gas during the period of 
analysis. Alternative specifications confirm that natural gas is a substitute source of 
energy for electricity at national level, and in the urban areas - the relative price 
variable has the expected negative sign and is significant.  
Our estimates of own-price elasticity are close to the study by He et al. (2011) 
estimate of -0.300 for household electricity demand with cross-section data in 2007; 
our results differ from the study by Lin (2003) who finds an average electricity price 
elasticity of 0.016 at national level. The latter paper uses time-series data, which does 
not take the province effect into account. The estimated elasticity close to zero seems 
unreasonable for the household sector. Considering pervious international studies, our 
findings also agree with price inelastic estimates for the USA, Australia, Taiwan and 
Sri Lanka (Table 3).  
 
Supply reliability and weather effects 
 
The electricity supply reliability significantly affects electricity consumption both for 
national and urban households as demonstrated in Table 5. The findings indicate that 
the electricity reliability is a key factor affecting residential electricity consumption in 
spite of electricity supplying enterprises having made efforts to improve the electricity 
supply reliability in China.   
Weather condition is also a highly significant factor influencing residential 
electricity consumption at national level and in the urban areas. These findings are 
consistent with previous studies on residential electricity consumption (Alberini and 
Filippini, 2011; Dergiades and Tsoulfidis, 2008; Holtedahl and Joutz, 2004; Nakajima 
and Hamori, 2010; Narayan and Smyth, 2005). 
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Table 7 
Testing for The Equivalence of Income Levels and Regional Income Effects 
 
 National  Urban  Rural  
Variable Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E. 
EP 0.277*** 0.015 0.261*** 0.024 0.311*** 0.021 
GP -0.450*** 0.010 -0.441*** 0.015 -0.445*** 0.019 
YA 1.452*** 0.028     
YU   1.363*** 0.039   
YR     0.955*** 0.032 
W -0.451*** 0.012 -0.362*** 0.018 -0.614*** 0.016 
R 0.071*** 0.005 0.056*** 0.007 0.116*** 0.006 
Inland -3.569*** 0.463 -4.589*** 0.603 -1.277*** 0.366 
Coastal -5.703*** 0.390 -5.610*** 0.511 -11.262*** 0.408 
EP : Inland -1.138*** 0.030 -1.033*** 0.045 -1.350*** 0.038 
EP: Coastal -0.588*** 0.023 -0.407*** 0.034 -0.442*** 0.030 
GP: Inland 0.545*** 0.024 0.547*** 0.026 0.504*** 0.025 
GP: Coastal 0.722*** 0.019 0.616*** 0.022 0.861*** 0.021 
YA: Inland -0.111*** 0.025     
YA: Coastal -0.111*** 0.024     
YU: Inland   -0.104** 0.034   
YU: Coastal   -0.077*  0.032   
YR: Inland     -0.099*** 0.016 
YR: Coastal     0.134*** 0.025 
W: Inland 0.925*** 0.021 0.966*** 0.026 0.838*** 0.017 
W: Coastal 0.604*** 0.021 0.536*** 0.025 0.793*** 0.025 
R: Inland -0.085*** 0.006 -0.075*** 0.008 -0.114*** 0.007 
R: Coastal -0.059*** 0.005 -0.043*** 0.008 -0.095*** 0.006 
SSE 12.823  14.006  13.524  
Adj.R^2 0.917  0.909  0.912  
Wooldridge's 
test 
chisq = 2.158, 
p-value = 0.142 
chisq = 1.373,  
p-value = 0.242 
chisq = 13.82,  
p-value =2.0e-04 
Pesaran CD 
test 
z = -0.711,  
p-value = 0.477 
z = -0.125,  
p-value = 0.900 
z = -1.898,  
p-value = 0.058 
The Chow test F=28.010 F=33.453 F=30.129 
 
Notes: Results are based on FGLS time effects estimators. The 1% critical value of 
the F distribution for the Chow test is  (0.  ,6,43 )= 2.834. ***, ** and * denote 
statistical significance at 1% level, 5% level, and 10% level, respectively. 
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Table 8 
Testing For The Price of A Substitute  
 
 National  Urban  Rural  
Variable Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E. 
RP 0.390*** 0.013 0.412*** 0.021 0.417*** 0.026 
YA 1.425*** 0.021     
YU   1.387*** 0.045   
YR     0.800*** 0.025 
W -0.455*** 0.011 -0.374*** 0.025 -0.572*** 0.028 
R 0.057*** 0.003 0.058*** 0.010 0.089*** 0.006 
Inland -8.224*** 0.197 -8.361*** 0.407 -6.857*** 0.358 
Coastal -4.387*** 0.210 -3.274*** 0.389 -5.472*** 0.353 
RP: Inland -0.427*** 0.014 -0.468*** 0.025 -0.410*** 0.027 
RP: Coastal -0.634*** 0.012 -0.544*** 0.021 -0.646*** 0.026 
YA: Inland 0.039* 0.018     
YA: Coastal -0.126*** 0.024     
YU: Inland   0.021 0.032   
YU: Coastal   -0.127** 0.041   
YR: Inland     0.086*** 0.012 
YR: Coastal     0.107*** 0.023 
W: Inland 0.909*** 0.013 0.948*** 0.035 0.730*** 0.035 
W: Coastal 0.570*** 0.011 0.483*** 0.025 0.487*** 0.030 
R: Inland -0.093*** 0.003 -0.095*** 0.009 -0.121*** 0.005 
R: Coastal -0.051*** 0.003 -0.050*** 0.010 -0.074*** 0.006 
SSE 14.901  15.680  17.668  
Adj.R^2 0.904  0.899  0.885  
Wooldridge's 
test 
chisq = 0.345,  
p-value = 0.557 
chisq = 0.882,  
p-value = 0.348 
chisq = 1.173,  
p-value = 0.279 
Pesaran CD 
test 
z = -0.656,  
p-value = 0.5121 
z = -0.094,  
p-value = 0.925 
z = -1.813,  
p-value = 0.070 
 
Notes: Results are based on FGLS time effects estimators. ***, ** and * denote 
statistical significance at 1% level, 5% level, and 10% level, respectively. 
 
Regional income effects 
 
The results reported in Table 7 represent tests of the regional income level impact on 
the price and income elasticities. Our findings are twofold. First, there are important 
differences across the three categories of regions since all the Chow tests are 
significant at 1% level ( (0.  ,6,43 )= 2.834). We, therefore, reject the null hypothesis 
that the electricity consumption function is uniform and conclude that there are 
significant differences in consumption behavior according to regional income levels.  
Second, regional variation affects the price and income elasticities. The 
estimates for each of the three regional categories are as follows.   
Coastal provinces: 
National: ?̂?= –0.311EP+0.272GP+1.341YA+0.153W+0.012R–5.703Coastal 
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Urban: ?̂?= –0.146EP+0.175GP+1.286YU+0.174W+0.013R–5.610Coastal 
Rural: ?̂?= –0.131EP+0.416GP+1.089YR+0.179W+0.021R–11.262Coastal 
Inland provinces: 
National: ?̂?= –0.861EP+0.095GP+1.341YA+0.474W–0.014R–3.569Inland 
Urban: ?̂?= –0.772EP+0.106GP+1.259YU+0.604W–0.019R–4.489Inland 
Rural: ?̂?= –1.039EP+0.059GP+0.856YR+0.224W+0.002R–1.277Inland 
The majority of electricity price elasticities are less than 1 and show that the 
lower the income level the higher the own price elasticity of demand. Particularly, 
households in inland provinces are much more sensitive to changes in electricity 
prices than households living in coastal provinces. In addition, their income 
elasticities of demand are consistently higher than 1. Interestingly, the own price 
elasticity is slightly greater than 1 for rural households in inland province, which also 
show low income elasticity of demand. The high price elasticities may imply that 
although the proportion of electricity expenditure in total household consumption is 
not as substantial as food expenditure, the income effects are still large.  
 
Price elasticity of substitute energy 
 
The parameters of the relative price of electricity to pipeline natural gas are reported 
in Table 8. They have the expected negative sign (except for rural households in 
inland provinces) and are highly significant, at the 1% level. The coefficients are 
-0.037, -0.056 and 0.007 for national, urban and rural income levels for the inland 
provinces, and -0.244, -0.132 and -0.229 respectively for the coastal provinces. 
Therefore, we conclude that overall pipeline natural gas is indeed a substitute for 
electricity in China, except in inland rural areas.  
 
Conclusion and policy implications 
 
A principal motivation for this paper is to evaluate the implications of the new 
residential electricity pricing system in China and to understand how households 
respond to changes in electricity prices across Chinese provinces differentiating 
between urban and rural households as well as across income groups. The issue of 
Chinese electricity demand at household levels has received little attention in the 
academic literature despite its considerable policy relevance. We apply panel data 
models to investigate demand responsiveness of households to change in electricity 
own-price and household income when controlling for other relevant factors, such as 
substitute energy prices, electricity supply reliability and weather condition using 
annual data from 29 provinces over the period 1998-2011.  
The main argument in the paper is that the perceived “low price” of domestic 
electricity in China may be true when referring to the economic development for the 
whole country. However, the “low price” is not true when different levels of average 
household income are considered. Our findings suggest that income is the prime 
driving force of residential electricity demand which mediates a variation in own price 
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elasticity across three categories of provinces. The residential electricity price 
elasticity is fairly high for the urban households in inland provinces compared to the 
coastal urban households. The second argument is that study on residential electricity 
consumption should not ignore the effect of electricity supply reliability due to 
electricity shortages and less advanced technology in developing countries, including 
China; otherwise, estimates may be biased. 
The results suggest that the new residential electricity pricing system in China 
should take into account the variation in price responsiveness, in particular, for urban 
households in inland provinces and for rural households. These households are more 
than five times as sensitive to changes in electricity prices as the households living in 
coastal urban areas which have average to high incomes. Furthermore, the electricity 
pricing system should take into account the variation in elasticity across the different 
tiers of the price schedule. In other words, important differences in the price elasticity 
in different blocks of the rate structure should be considered in the new electricity 
pricing system. For instance, for high-income households there is considerable room 
for price increase which can be used to finance the development of the supply system.  
While our findings are robust, a limitation of the paper is that the conclusions 
are drawn from a relatively small dataset and fixed effects models. Future work 
should include prices of other conventional energy sources to investigate in more 
detail the effects in rural areas. Also, residential bill data could help to further 
examine baseline quantities as well as to distinguish between short-run and long-run 
effects.  
 
Notes 
 
1. Inner Mongolia Electric Power Company, 1998, The History of Chinese 
Electricity Industry: Inner Mongolia Electricity Industry from 1903 to 1996, Inner 
Mongolia People’ Publishing press. 
2. “The review of Chinese Electricity Pricing System reform”, 2009, Center for 
Industrial Energy Efficiency.  
3. See footnote 2. 
4. The Local Chronicles of Guangxi Province: Electricity Industry Volume, 1992, 
China Water Power Press. 
5. The Local Chronicles of Wuhan City from 1980 to 2000: Electricity Industry 
Volume, Wuhan University Press. 
6. On the 4th of April in 1998, the NDPC issued “Strengthen the administration of 
electricity prices in rural area, and forbidden collecting fees, apportion and fine 
illegally to end-users” (document No. 39); on the 30th of April in 1998, the SGCC 
issued “Strengthen the administration of electricity prices in rural area and 
reducing the burden on farmer” (document 02). 
7. The National Development and Reform Commission: Most provinces achieved 
one price, http://www.ndrc.gov.cn/xwfb/t20000630_27822.htm, accessed on 
01/2011.  
8. It is generally accepted that there is high level of income inequality in China. For 
example, a study from Song, Zhu, and Mukhopadhyay (2009).    
9. See Athukrala and Wilson (2010), Filippini and Pachauri (2004), Halicioglu 
(2007), Holtedahl (2004), Nakajima and Hamori (2010), Sa’ad (2009), Narayan, 
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Smyth and Prasad (2007), Narayan and Smyth (2005), Nakajima (2010). 
10. See the relevant summary of previous studies by Narayan and Smyth (2005). 
11. This view is also supported by Hartman and Werth (1981), Reiss and White (2002) 
and Acton, Mithell and Mowill (1976). 
12. The China Price Information Network 
http://www.chinaprice.com.cn/fgw/chinaprice/free/index.htm accessed on10/2012. 
13. The Weather Underground provides the most localized weather condition 
available, and it is committed to delivering the most reliable, accurate weather 
information possible. It includes almost 19,000 weather stations in the US and 
over 13,000 weather stations across the rest of the worlds. 
14. See Equation 1 and 2 for the definition of each variable. 
15. See Yao, Chen and Li (2012). 
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